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Yemen is an unsteady country with a long history of conflict and many complex issues 
that have led to the deterioration of the political, economic, and social situation. The 
conflict in its various stages began as an internal political struggle as a result of the 
people's grievances and the elite's competition for power and national wealth, in 
addition to other external factors. Hence, it is important to study the conflict factors in 
Yemen to understand the situation which in turn will help in providing solutions by 
decision-makers towards peace-making. Therefore, this study analyses the conflict 
factors in Yemen based on the political, economic, and social effects, in addition to the 
external interference effects. The research findings indicated that the conflict factors 
were not the only result of security or political issues but also presented by many socio-
economic problems as well as external factors, which have affected of the country 
since its unification. 




Yemen is one of the countries located in the Arabian Peninsula, which is 
characterized by a long history of conflict and many complex issues during 
which it has gone through periods of peace and prosperity, but it has not lasted. 
The crisis was exacerbating and expanding from time to time. These 
circumstances generally led to the worsening of the security and political 
position there and also had an impact on the economic and social spheres. 
Yemen is confronting a unique concourse of crises. A continuing civil war 
and several political and tribal conflicts in the North, a Southern secessionist 
movement, and the last of them is the Houthi coup against the government and 
thwarting the transitional period. Even under the rule of the former Yemeni 
President Saleh, the central authorities in Yemen have never been powerful. In 
addition, through a delicate balance between the military and security 
establishment, clergy, and the major tribes, he was able to maintain his power 
(Boucek, & Ottaway, 2010). 
As one of the poorest Arab nations, Yemen is suffering from rapid 
population growth and one of the greatest growth rates in the world. But these 
high growth rates are more than the capacity of the state to meet its people's 
demands, which leads to more problems at the local level. Throughout history, 
Yemen, especially in the twentieth century, has faced many external endeavors 
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to intervene in its state affairs. The global challenges, on the other hand, have 
hindered the country's growth process. Such problems have also plagued them 
at the domestic level. In 2009, the financial crisis increased the rate of poverty 
in several countries, including Yemen (Breisinger, et al. 2011). 
It can be said that the conflicts that occurred in Yemen before the 
unification of its two parts were due to the political factor, which is the struggle 
of the political elites for power and governance. Accordingly, in this study, we 
will discuss the factors that led to the conflict in Yemen, in the period from after 
achieving unity until the present time. The subject of the present research is to 
identify and track the different political, economic, social, and cultural factors 
that are constantly in flux and evolve, and to do so specifically in the context of 
the Yemen conflict. To do this, the article focuses on, among other things, the 
social, political, economic, and cultural dimensions of the matter. These are the 
factors that nourished and bred the current war and made it the complex social, 
political, and cultural phenomenon that it is in Yemen today. 
This article offers background information on Yemen's situation to clear 
the context in which the conflict emerged by describing and investigating the 
factors that led to this, Thus it is the framework for decision-makers to move 
forward in the process of peace-making in Yemen. The major contribution of 
this study:  
(a) Taxonomy of the Yemen conflict factors based on the local political, 
economic, social and the external interference. 
(b) Analysis the Yemen conflict factors based on their effects on the 
conflict. 
Rest of the study is organized as the following: section 2 present the 
review of the related studies, section 3 offer the methodology which follows to 
achieve the objective of this study, section 4 provide a discussion of the conflict 
factors and section 5 which conclude the study. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Yemen has a lengthy history of complex turmoil and conflicts (Aboueldahab, 
2019) resulting from political, economic, and social reasons. Yemen has not 
witnessed stability since the unification of its southern and northern parts, as 
political differences between the internal parties have caused instability and 
chaos, which subsequently led to conflict in the country. This section reviews 
the existing studies related to the conflict in Yemen. As Al-Tamimi and 
Venkateshe pointed out that the revolution of 2011 in Yemen has started as a 
result of the suffering of the Yemeni people for decades under a dictatorial 
regime that relied on the tribal card to ensure the continuity of its power. In 
addition to their discontent regarding the unemployment, economic decline, and 
corruption throughout the country (Al-Tamimi and Venkateshe 2020). 
All attempts to improve the nation's "formal" institutions, according to 
Philips, culminate in the corruption patronage network becoming more powerful. 
Recognizing the significance of this network allows one to appreciate the non-
traditional tasks that the Yemeni state has been able to perform to suppress 
and take advantage of a succession of crises for political purposes (Phillips 
2017). Dingli argued that analytically examining Yemeni politics through the 
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internal dynamics of tribal and patronage networks, and also the nature of the 
regime's and its constantly changing coalitions and crisis since unification, 
enables one to comprehend the regime's complicated and volatile structure and 
methods. As he argued, the use of purposefully generated chaos is considered 
the most crucial (Dingli 2013). 
According to Ghoble the current situation is the result of a conflict 
between the top regional players, Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as the stance 
of the US and Russia in changing dynamics. He assessed the ongoing 
hardship, emphasizing that the conflict is mostly driven by geoeconomic 
considerations and is not limited to the issue of regional hegemony (Ghoble 
2019). Serr also claimed that the military situation among the conflict's actors is 
deadlocked, citing animosity, mistrust, and sectarianism as the motivations for 
their differences. Furthermore, an increase in the Saudi–Iranian fight for 
regional domination could result in the conflict escalating further (Serr 2017). 
Through the review of the previous works mentioned above, it can be 
found that these studies are limited to some conflict factors such as regional 
competition, sectarianism, political and economic factors. In addition, due to 
prolonged conflict, which inevitably leads to the emergence of new factors that 
increase the intensity and complexity of the conflict. This limitation and research 
gap motivated us to provide a comprehensive analysis of the conflict factors in 
Yemen. Therefore, this study analyses the factors that led to the rise of the 




The paper adopts the descriptive research method to investigate the factors 
which led to the conflict in Yemen in order to obtain a better understanding of 
the nature of the Yemeni conflict that should be the basis of any peace process 
to resolve the conflict. 
Data source and scope: the research relied on secondary data and 
resources, which include books, articles, and reports, in order to present a 
sufficient overview of the factors which led to the conflict in Yemen. The scope 
of the focus of this study involves the secondary data available during the 
instability period which was after the summer of the 1994 war until the current 
conflict. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Political observers agree on the combination of factors that caused the social 
explosion known as revolts. The lethal combination of factors, combined with 
the oppressive and aggressive existence of regimes and the repression of 
individual freedoms, results in economic decline and government corruption 
(Cockburn 2011). For years, rising instability has led many to expect the 
eventual breakdown of Yemen. As the state spiraled into civil war, these 
predictions became true in late 2014. The dispute pits a coalition of the Houthis 
along with forces and militias faithful to the former president Saleh, against 
supporters and allies of the government overthrown by the Houthis in early 
2015 (Juneau 2010). 
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This section provides a description and an analysis of the main factors 
which caused the conflict in Yemen, according to the classification proposed in 
this research. This article classifies the conflict factors into two main factors. 
The first one is internal factors at the national level and the second one is 
external factors at the regional and international level. The internal factors 
include: 1) political, 2) economic and social. The external factors include: 1) 
geopolitical interests and competition for regional sovereign between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran, as shown in the figure.1 below. 
Figure1 Taxonomy on factors of conflict in Yemen 
                                      
Source: authors’ proposal 
                                      
Internal Factors 
The authors believe that the conflict in Yemen has internal factors which are the 
main reasons that lead to the current complicated situation. This section 
investigates and analyzes the political, economic, and social factors. 
Political Factors  
Theoretically, Yemen has a representative parliament and president, a 
multiparty system, an autonomous judiciary, and a democratically elected local 
government structure. However, political power is not created or transferred by 
these institutions. Alternatively, power and wealth are created and conveyed 
through a largely informal, yet profoundly textured network which based on 
tribal and regional patronage relations (Alley 2010a). 
Internally, President Salih's strategy was to construct alliances of various 
parties and tribes. He had no clear political agenda, but whenever he could, he 
subsumed coalitions of various stripes, not hesitating to form new allies 
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of Yemen, establishing links with several of very distinct donors and sponsors. 
During the Cold War, that meant negotiating with both sides and disregarding 
ideology. Salih purchased Moscow's new military weapons and sent Yemenis 
for military coaching in the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, he persuaded the United 
States and several other Western countries as well as Arab Gulf Countries to 
provide generous economic assistance (Rugh 2015). 
Centralization of governance: The previous regime depended on the 
system of central government and a pattern of unequal development, which 
influenced the subsequent development of the modern state of Yemen and led 
to the region's economic, social and cultural marginalization. Exploitative 
center-periphery relations, embodied in urban skewed economic policies that 
have triggered tensions that later endanger national unity, are an operating 
principle of this system (Salih 2013). 
The government followed the same pattern of unequal development and 
developed economic plans that benefited the ruling party and its supporters. 
National wealth continued to be concentrated geographically in the center under 
this system, together with the severe accumulation of wealth in the hands of a 
few people associated with the regime and the growing severity of poverty in 
the other regions. These evolutions added to grievances and widened 
socioeconomic inequalities on a national scale. 
Patronage system: In the mid-1980s a sea change took place in the 
political economy, where the central government in Yemen in 1986 took 
dramatic steps to increase direct taxation and regulate the private sector. The 
strict control of imports by the state was of particular significance. A radical 
change took place in the business class in Yemen and the traditional role of 
tribal elites through the regime's control of import licenses (Dresch, & Paul, 
2000). 
Salih has entered dozens of tribesmen into the business community 
while traditional trading houses rose and fell based on their willingness to 
cooperate with the president and the new tribal business elite. In short, around 
this time, patronage networks extending from the President became a central 
part of the production and transfer of power. In reality, Saleh has established a 
profoundly organized network of tribal and regional patronage relationships 
(Alley 2010a). This unofficial system of patronage is a dynamic game of 
haggling between Saleh and his clients. 
Since becoming President of North Yemen in1978, Salih's rule has relied 
on an unofficial system of patronage (Alley 2010a). The President immediately 
started after taking office to set his family members and close leaders of the 
Sanhan tribe, to which he belonged, in influential positions of military and 
security. In addition, Salih also worked to integrate powerful social elites, 
especially tribal shaykhs, into networks of patronage through direct subsidy, 
distribution of government positions, and ultimately access to the private sector, 
as well as coup-proofing the military-security apparatus through family and tribal 
appointments. 
Repression has been used by the Yemeni regime, but President Saleh 
has been especially effective in selecting and exploiting alternate elites through 
a comprehensive patronage network (Phillips 2017). The inner circle of the 
regime, a clandestine group composed mostly of relatives of Saleh, operated 
the most sensitive military posts in the country and controlled its economy. The 
Yemeni state cannot be seized independently of this regime, because official 
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roles will be minor to that of the actor in the network of Saleh. The patronage 
network of state money, mainly aid and oil revenues, was largely established 
and maintained by Saleh and used positions in the state to reward obedience or 
buy off dissenters (Phillips 2008). In addition,  despite of Saleh was impeached 
in 2011, most of his regime continued to function (Alley 2013). This included 
elite performers, but also managers at lower levels who owed Saleh's network 
their jobs as public servants. 
The energy sector is a profitable source of state revenue, which the 
president uses for his patronage networks. Oil revenues constituted 90 percent 
of the export income of the country and nearly 75% of the budget of the central 
government (Gerner & Tordo 2007). These revenues fund most of the 
government expenditures, which include civil servants and military wages. 
Moreover, the President is able distribute access to oil concessions, as well as 
the ability to market the Yemeni government's share of produced crude oil to 
influential customers. In short, domestic oil production and diesel subsidies 
represented a massive expansion of government wealth, and hence an 
expansion of the President's patronage networks. 
In addition to the increasing economic dominance, Salih founded the 
General People's Congress (GPC) in 1982 as a quasi-party organization, which 
integrated a wide range of social groups and political trends. "The GPC 
identified itself as an explicitly non-partisan, nationalistic organization that 
objectives were "state-building, democracy, constitutional ruling, modernization, 
and the creation of military-security establishments (Carapico 2007). 
Undoubtedly that the inclusiveness of the patronage system in Yemen 
has contributed to the longevity of the ruling regime. Any kind of gain is earned 
by most influential elites, whether they are allied with the governing GPC or 
members of the formal opposition, and thus have some interest in maintaining 
the status quo. Until recently, the creation of a radical or pragmatic opposition 
with the willingness or ability to impact regime change has been hampered by 
this ecumenical distribution. 
The absence of a governance system: weakness of the system of 
government, as the state’s presence, was confined to urban areas and major 
cities, while peripheral, tribal and rural areas, the state’s presence was weak 
and near nothing. In Yemen's countryside, where most of the citizens are 
concentrated, the government's presence was represented through the local 
elite who have connections to the Saleh's network. Although local elites 
frequently have a tribal history, the Yemeni state's failure to monopolize conflict 
or penetrate the periphery can therefore not be reduced to a fight between 
modern and traditional modes of government. Rather it was the consequence of 
Saleh's system of governance focused on polarization and patronage that 
funded by the state (Clausen 2018). 
Yemen's historic bad governance has driven the population to search out 
services from other providers and this void has been filled by the growing 
extremist groups under this situation. Where these groups provided some 
services and thus entrenched the idea that the government is unable to meet 
the needs of these areas. It was therefore argued that the support of extremist 
groups was based on its ability to fill the void of security and governance left by 
the government, rather than any clear support for its ideologies (ICG, 2017). In 
addition, many people in Yemen have funded these groups out of sheer 
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dissatisfaction with the government's inability to provide services and better 
governance (al-Dawari 2014). 
On the one hand, the resource base of the regime is diminishing, 
especially as declining oil revenues threaten the budget of the central 
government (EIU 2010). On the other hand, the President has decided to 
restrict the distribution of Fortunes and important leadership positions in 
government institutions within his family particularly his son and nephews. In 
addition to these two destabilizing tendencies, a coalition of grassroots leaders 
coordinating the southern protest campaign "Hirak" in the territories of former 
South Yemen were also unable to effectively co-opt the President. In summary, 
the shrinking resource base, the perceived straitening of the distribution of 
patronage within the family of the President, and the presence of a large 
number of grassroots leaders beyond the paradigm of patronage are important 
reasons for the elite's aversion to the regime that led to the collapse of his 
regime in 2011. 
 
The Economic Factors  
From a socio-economic viewpoint, Yemen is one of the world's least developed 
countries (LDCs), with an average per capita GDP (PPP) of US$ 2,800 in 2015, 
194 out of 228 countries. More than half of the Yemeni population is poor and 
has a low rate of adult literacy, estimated at 70% overall and just 55% among 
women. This is paired with a high 2.47 % annual population rise (CIA, 2007). 
Moreover, the Government of Yemen relies highly on oil revenues, which 
represent more than 77% of the country's total exports. In economic growth and 
average population enrichment, this heavy oil dependency has never been 
translated, differentiating the country from all the other Rentier States of the 
Arab Peninsula mainly due to an increased population and reduced oil 
extraction. 
The country's reliance on food imports is another key economic problem, 
as the agricultural sector is the main source of subsistence and the main 
demand for primary food commodities is not adequate. The country's chronic 
water shortage is the key difficulty in agricultural production, "Its renewable 
sources are estimated to supply 2.1 billion cubic meters per year while current 
annual extraction is estimated at 3.5 billion cubic meters" (Lackner 2014). This 
means that Yemen is depleting its water sources at a stunning pace. 
Financial pressures are one of the most important motivating factors and 
drivers of conflict, particularly when corruption at the hands of the ruling and 
social elite is introduced. These tendencies have resulted in the economic 
impoverishment of the majority of the population, a fact dramatically illustrated 
by the staggering rise in food prices and high unemployment rates, especially 
among young people under the age of 25, who make up approximately 65% of 
the total population. This is in marked contraindication to the continuing 
enrichment of the governing elites, who have managed to amass an immense 
amount of wealth through corruption (Engin 2011). 
Economic marginalization: the economic and political marginalization 
of the Saada region, the unequal distribution of natural resources and political 
participation, and religious discrimination against its Zaidi population, some 
scholars and researchers argue, have given fertile ground for the Houthi 
movement to take root and flourish (Brandt, 2017). While in reality, all of the 
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aforementioned grievances have been exposed to the Saada governorate and 
the various groups of the people in the country, except for the political elite and 
those who are included in the patronage system. It is not logical to identify with 
all the grievances in a particular region apart from other regions that may have 
been subjected to more injustice. 
Transparency International (TI) classified Yemen as one of the world's 
corrupt states in 2010, and the Middle East region's second most corrupt. 
Patronage and cronyism haunt Yemen in almost every facet of the industry. To 
create and broaden his patronage-client relationships, Saleh used his political 
party, the General People's Congress (GPC). A GPC membership is a mark of 
"loyalty" to the regime, and it is composed of national committees that represent 
central government objectives as a way of receiving government benefits (Alley 
2010b). 
Yemen faces a laundry list of development problems in addition to 
corruption and has not found the balance between growing its potential and 
supplying basic commodities to the public. Generally, the state of Yemen does 
not provide its 23.5 million population with basic services, which is increasing at 
a rate of 2.7 percent per year (Alley 2010b). To make the problem worse, in the 
next decade, its oil revenue, which accounts for most of the state's income, will 
expire. Another rapidly dwindling natural resource is water, and it is still 
recognized as Yemen's biggest threat (Ward 2014). 
Struggle over wealth and resources: The battle between the "center" 
and the "periphery" for economic resources and political autonomy is a 
constant, endemic characteristic of Yemen's policy. Approximately 28 million 
Yemenis of various affiliations are competing for the scarce resources in their 
country. The lack of water is a source of tension in society and a possibly 
growing obstacle to the future is at the forefront of these environmental and 
resource problems. Water scarcity has led to the spreading of waterborne 
illnesses on an unimaginable level across the country. As a consequence, 
Yemen's shortage of sanitation and safe water accounts for 50% of the mortality 
of children and babies (Ward, 2014). In addition, small-scale farming utilizes 
nearly 90% of Yemen's water supply, but the agricultural sector accounts for 
just 6% of the state's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Part of the issue is that 
the planting of Qat, a plant which a large number of Yemenis have chewed, 
accounts for around 50% of the agricultural sector's water use. 
Economic difficulties are not limited to its lack of water in Yemen, it is a 
low-income nation, heavily dependent on diminishing oil supplies. Nearly 25 % 
of its GDP is focused on oil sales, and terrorist attacks regularly threaten the 
country's pipelines. Yemen is also suffering from food shortages and a high 
unemployment rate. The rate of youth unemployment is projected at 33.7 % in a 
nation (Rogers, 2012), with a strong population growth rate of 2.3 % (The World 
Bank, 2019). These economic problems are further compounded by weak 
governance, corruption, and the country's uncertainty and insecurity. In gun 
ownership, Yemen also ranks second globally (Rogers 2012). 
 
The Social Factors  
There are different key problems on the social side of the conflict factors, such 
as complex tribal and sectarian systems that appear to crystallize society and 
discourage social improvements of the more indigent and favor corruption and 
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tribal patron-client frameworks. The fact that 40 percent of the total population is 
under the age of fourteen is another key issue, which, combined with a poorly 
organized school system, is the ideal atmosphere for terrorist organizations to 
promote and grow their core membership. 
The Yemeni countryside is marked by a lack of government facilities, a 
shortage of water, electricity, and employment prospects. In addition to the lack 
of awareness and widespread poverty in those areas, many youths join 
extremist groups to earn a living, as well some local dignitaries who have long 
been ignored by the central government for a long time and found their desire 
for a public status met by becoming a part of those groups. 
Finally, a study of the reasons underlying the crisis in Yemen could not 
disregard the reality of the central government only has little influence over the 
state's territory. Much of the central government continues limited to the big 
urbanized regions. Service delivery to rural areas is highly challenging and a 
population of almost three-quarters lives outside the cities. The tribes continue 
to play a strong role in filling the void created by the state and have penetrated 
the institutions of the state. They have important positions in Yemen's legislative 
and administrative bodies, in the military forces, in the safety apparatus, and in 
the overall political structure. Therefore, strategic decision-making involves 
negotiation, settlement, and barter in the sense of relationships that are 
continually changing (Ahmed 2015). 
Poverty and widespread unemployment: the population increase has 
produced youth with no employment prospects. Yemen's government was 
unable to provide work or a purposeful education. There was also an under-
development of the private sector. As a result, there was much youth in a 
desperate situation. Their desperation generated grievances in a collapsed 
state context for the greed-driven elites, who desired to follow their own 
ambitions, with readily accessible human resources. Eventually, the elites took 
advantage of this chance and structured the youths in the way they were drawn 
to them. 
In Yemen, the existence of the labor force poses a paradox of sorts. 
Yemen is suffering from a debilitating rate of illiteracy. An estimated 43% of 
Yemenis live below the poverty line and a whopping 40% of Yemenis have jobs 
(Fatah, 2011). In pursuit of works, a large number of Yemeni men travel abroad. 
Projects for local development are unmanaged and village societies remain 
heavily reliant on emigrant workers' remittances. These employees can return 
home with savings invested in small businesses such as shops, but rising 
inflation renders these business ventures economically unviable. From the 
1980s to the present, importing food has been cheaper than growing it. 
The proliferation of weapons: The availability of weapons has 
intensified the conflict in Yemen. The citizens of Yemen were well-armed. The 
availability of arms, combined with all the grievances and conflicts alluded to 
above, culminated in a full-scale civil war. 
Yemen is commonly cited as one of the most highly armed societies, in 
terms of per capita, in the world. Despite entirely fabricated, very unplausible, 
estimates of 50-60 million small and light weapons in circulation, more logical 
evaluations indicate something for every two civilians in the order of 10 million 
or less small arms or approximately one firearm. A recent Yemen National 
Small Arms Ownership Survey found that 61% of respondents registered guns 
in their households. Weapons proliferation was described by Rashad al-Alimi, 
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Deputy Prime Minister for Security and Defense Affairs, and former Interior 
Minister, as one of Yemen's four 'security challenges'; the others were terrorist 
attacks, border protection, and 'poor state loyalty.' The availability of weapons is 
often cited as being significantly linked to the rapid escalation of armed conflict 
in Yemen (YAVA 2010). 
 
The External Factors 
This section investigates and analyzes the factors at the regional and 
international level in two aspects as the following: 
Geopolitical Interests  
At the external stage, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the GCC, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France have geopolitical interests in Yemen. The security 
issue is of great importance for Saudi Arabia, counter-terrorism for the US and 
the UAE. In addition, US priorities include a secure Yemeni government and 
free movement to the Bab al-Mandeb, as well as a secure Saudi border (Laub 
2015). 
Iran and the Houthis share similar geopolitical interests. Iran tries to 
challenge the region's Saudi and US dominance, and the Houthis are the main 
opposition in Sana'a to Hadi's Saudi-and US-backed government. However, It 
should be taken into account that the participation of multiple external actors in 
Yemen does not change anything in the circumstances in which the conflict is 
still closely linked to domestic dynamics. 
The US position is to combat terrorists to stabilize the country, to defeat 
the proliferation of Iran in the region, to protect the Saudi border, to enforce the 
results of the NDC and SC Resolution 2216, and to ensure the safe and free 
passage of Bab al-Mandeb. The interest behind the latter, though is financial. 
On the one hand, the US sells approximately $110 billion worth of weaponry to 
the Saudis, and on the other, via the Bab al-Mandeb checkpoint, 4.7 million 
barrels of oil per day transit (Kleemann 2019). 
The continued and expanded 'targeted killing' policy pursued by the 
United States of America, with the express consent of the State of Yemen, 
against designated Al-Qaeda targets, which were mainly carried out by the use 
of drones, was an additional external factor that helped destabilize Yemen 
(Open Society Justice Initiative. 2015). As one analyst recently noted, 
"journalistic and think-tank reporting has tended to overlook the deleterious 
impacts on state sovereignty and regime legitimacy of US counter-terrorism 
airstrikes against al-Qaeda targets." 
Competition for Regional Sovereign between Saudi Arabia and Iran  
Although the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran is sometimes alluded to as 
the Sunni-Shia war, their competition is motivated by their regional interests 
rather than a sectarian one. In the Middle East, both nations compete to 
maximize their spheres of influence, making a rather turbulent area even more 
chaotic. Tehran is attempting to export its thoughts to countries with a large 
Shia sect, such as Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia's Petroleum eastern areas. 
While Saudi Arabia and the other Arab concerned perceive the propagation of 
the revolutionary agenda of Iran in their regions as seriously dangerous, it can 
provoke disorder within the society, as they worry. 
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Up to now, both Saudi Arabia and Iran have avoided military 
confrontation directly. Rather, they attempt to exploit current tensions in the 
region for their benefit by proxy wars, both regimes fight for dominance. In the 
regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Yemen is not the only frontline; 
both support opposition groups in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Bahrain. However, 
the Yemen dispute is central to the Saudi-Iranian's force struggle. It has 
strategic importance for Saudi Arabia, as they share long borders; but Tehran 
succeeds in holding the Saudis occupied with little effort and putting 
considerable economic, political, and military pressure on them (Gidon & Peter 
2016). 
Since the USS Cole attack in 2000, relations between the US and 
Yemen have focused on counterterrorism. The pressure from Washington to 
crack down on terrorist networks causes Yemen to participate in a risky 
balancing act. On the one side, perceptions of alignment with the U.S. are 
extremely unpopular with the Yemeni public, placing the government at risk of 
stoking an already volatile environment. The government, on the other hand, 
wants greater assistance and support, especially in capacity-building for the 
army and security forces. The difficult relations that Yemen has with Saudi 
Arabia and the United States are significant. Overt interference by either the 
United States or Saudi Arabia is highly unpopular since distrust and suspicion of 
foreign actors are extremely high in Yemen (Juneau 2010). 
In 2015, it became evident that Salafi groups emerged in Yemen as an 
effective fighting force and that the United Arab Emirates was their main 
external supporter (UAE). Essentially, in the view of the speaker, the UAE has 




Many factors explain why the conflict arising in Yemen. At the same time, The 
internal influential actors ’competition for power and resources is emerging as a 
catalyst that has led, along with other factors, to the conflict. Also, the prominent 
role of the strategy of regional and international powers cannot be ignored, 
especially after the outbreak of the war, whether through direct intervention or 
any form of support, which can be considered a factor in the raging and 
continuation of the conflict. 
It is extremely important to note that local political, social, and economic 
grievances are the key drivers of the conflict and that the rise of the Houthis 
was enabled by the assistance of former President Saleh and his network of 
tribal and military supporters, as well as by their exploitation of public 
disgruntlement with the transitional government. This is a key issue for such an 
unstable state that is complaining about weak of centralized power and the lack 
of resources. The confluence of these factors has made Yemen an area that is 
insecure and dangerous, providing fertile ground for extremist groups and 
ideas. 
Furthermore, it must be said, Yemen remains to face challenges from 
systemic development issues that inevitably worsen the political crisis recently 
and in the past. The important development challenges are high poverty rates 
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and illiteracy, diminishing water supplies and a rapid increase unemployment 
due to high population growth coupled with economic decline. 
The majority of the citizens of Yemen have genuine grievances. Basic 
services such as security, stability, education, health, and employment services 
have been neglected by the government. Additionally, the government has used 
military power to suppress citizens. In other words, Failure to provide Public 
Services lead to ignorance and backwardness. The increase in the number of 
unemployed youths in Yemen, which leads to fuel and continue the conflict by 




Yemen is a troubled country that suffers from many problems, most of which 
were in both parts of the country and it was inherited by the state emerging from 
the unification of 1990. The Republic of Yemen was created as a result of an 
incorrect unification process, as differences emerged between the leaderships 
of the two sides, which resulted in the civil war in 1994, in which the northern 
and southern pro-unification powers were victorious, due to many factors, that 
resulted in increasing dissatisfaction among the other southerners. 
A synergy of negative factors characterized the period from 1994 to 2010 
such as the narrowing of political liberties, increasing poverty, the decline in 
state revenue, and economic recession. A small faction, consisting of relatives 
and close associates surrounding President Ali Saleh, has gradually 
monopolized political influence. With the government failing to take the required 
steps to reform the security, fiscal, health, and education sectors, a 
community's well-being is often left to the people themselves. From this 
viewpoint, the precarious security position that results from the state's failures 
detrimentally affects the capacity of a society to evolve. 
To sum up, this research dealt with the conflict in Yemen since the 
achievement of the unity between its two parts, focusing on the factors that led 
to instability in the country. This study presented a new classification of the 
factors of the conflict in Yemen, in terms of the internal political, economic, and 
social effects and the impact of external interventions as well. In addition to 
analyzing these factors and their impact on the conflict since the unification of 
the country. 
Consequently, this study found that the conflict in Yemen began mainly 
an internal dispute, sparked by domestic grievances and domestic power and 
resource rivalry. Which exacerbated and later expanded to form external factors 
due to external interventions. This study can impact future researches in terms 
of understanding the factors and their effects on the conflict in Yemen, as well 
as providing a vision for decision-makers about the causes and effects of the 
conflict, through which a comprehensive peace plan can be built for the country. 
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